Chapter Four

Social Media, Speed, and Authentic Living

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This is ultimately an essay in the ethics of living. As such, my concern is thoroughly normative in nature. In fact, it may even dabble in a bit of moralizing. In particular, I am curious about what is required for living-well by our own lights; particularly, in an age where the use of social media has become ubiquitous. I will warn the reader that the conclusion I urge here may be sobering for those who hold that the platforms of social media are personally liberating and who remain tantalized by the prospects of its value in the lives of people.

Polonius’s final advice to Laertes was, “To thine own self be true.” In the Elizabethean age this likely meant to be true to one’s own best interests; especially, to avoid behavior that would be harmful to one’s reputation (Guignon, 2004). It now has a more substantive interpretation that one should live a life which reflects our deepest concerns and commitments. It beckons us to personal integrity or authentic living of a certain kind—a personally valuable existence. I will contend that this goal requires time to discover what one most cares about and that the structurally imposed speed of social media appears to be antithetical to the importance of such time.

In the present age, the vast realm of social media from MMORPGs (Massively Multi-Player Online Role-Playing Games), such as World of Warcraft and Second Life, to the social networking media of Facebook, MySpace, Twitter and others, increasingly occupy people’s attention and, for many, they hold these activities to be a part of what makes their lives satisfactory. A few philosophers have taken up the question of the value of these emerging technologies. Here I too will enter the fray.
Hubert Dreyfus is a philosopher who has long been skeptical of the value of electronic technology in our lives. In a recent work, he has raised concerns about the value of the internet especially as a social medium (Quoted in French, 2010). In particular, Dreyfus has proclaimed that one cannot find valuable living in the social media venue of Second Life. In Second Life you choose an avatar (a virtual self of your own creation) and lead your avatar to live out a life interacting with other avatars, including socializing, as well as purchasing products and services with which to “live,” such as, clothing, real-estate, etc. Dreyfus argues that though one’s avatar can mimic life in the real-world, it cannot be a life of authenticity. One may wonder why one would feel the urge to argue for this conclusion given that Second Life is by design illusory and artificial. The hours and dedication users of MMORPGs (including Second Life) give to developing their avatars in these virtual worlds make this a relevant question. A casual look at market studies appears to show that regular players average between 20 and 25 hours per week and avid players average 48 hours per week developing the lives of their avatars. Dreyfus argues that the virtual metaverse of Second Life allows us to deeply distract ourselves from the authentic life in which one is called to face up to one’s finitude and the vulnerability of all one cares about (French, p. 103). In Dreyfus’s mind, what makes the MMORPGs inauthentic and an impoverished mode of living is that they promote the denial of the human condition, in particular human suffering, finitude, impotence, and the moral indifference of the universe.

**SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE DEFINITION OF THE GOOD LIFE**

Philosopher Peter French argues that Dreyfus’s critique of Second Life relies upon a singular conception of the good life, which is itself clearly open to question. French rightfully queries, “Why should the criterion of (an authentic) life be bravely facing the truth of human finitude and the vulnerability to failure and the impermanence of all of our most treasured projects...?” (French, p. 103). By way of contrast to Dreyfus’s existential concerns about Second Life, French offers the story of a white male, Bob, who is a paralyzed and disfigured Iraq war veteran and who suffers from PTSD and a deep loneliness (French, p. 101–102). Bob hears about Second Life and decides to check it out. For no particular reason, he designs his avatar to be a beautiful African American woman with platinum blond hair. Bob’s avatar, after months of regular and then avid playing, has a business, numerous friends, and a lesbian relationship in this virtual world. Bob spends most of his waking hours in Second Life, absorbed by the experiences of his avatar. French asks, is this man’s second life less meaningful than his first simply in virtue of the fact that his avatar’s experiences are virtual rather than real? French argues that Bob’s life is not to be judged as impoverished on the basis of so narrow a conception of authentic living as proposed by Dreyfus. French argues, following Harry Frankfurt, that what makes a life meaningful is our seeing to the flourishing of the objects we care about. And Bob cares deeply about the welfare of his virtual self and mate in Second Life, and so finds meaning in his avatar’s successes and failures. So, even in immersing ourselves in MMORPGs like Second Life, we may find objects over which we can experience significant joy and regret. As such, French concludes that one can lead an authentic life through the social medium of Second Life when we care deeply about our avatar’s welfare and her projects.

I am not quite convinced that finding meaning and value in a world of virtual objects and projects can be considered as authentic as concern for those in the real world, because intuitively it seems to me that there is something about the illusory element of MMORPGs that makes them less valuable than caring about the welfare of real things and doings. (See Bloomfield in this volume for such an argument.) However, I am not quite sure how to make that case at this time without consequently disparaging other virtual worlds such as those found in novels, films, and theoretical physics, but the object of my concern lies elsewhere. I want to urge that the most popular forms of social media, Facebook and MySpace, do not lend themselves to even subjective well-being, that is, to developing and sustaining objects of genuine concern on which our sense of personal well-being depends.

**LIVING A LIFE WORTH LIVING**

I think that French’s use of Frankfurt’s ideas from “The Importance of What We Care About” (Frankfurt, 1988) is on the right track as to how we should best understand authentic living or, at the very least, subjective well-being, e.g., what it is to flourish by our own lights. To live a life worth living from a personal point of view is to act in ways that reflect what we most truly care about, and the value of our living is measured both by how well we do this and how well the objects or projects about which we care fare in this world. The benefit of this view is that it allows for a plurality of authentic ways of living rather than those limited to one conception of the good life, like the dreary, existential one favored by Dreyfus.

Let us for a moment consider some of the details of Frankfurt’s understanding of the importance of what we care about. The notion of caring about something is, in part, related to our behavior but it is broader than ethics. We can care about things other than being moral. (Although morality is often something we care about deeply.) We find, according to Frankfurt, that “more or less stable attitudinal and behavioral disposition(s)” in part reflect what a person cares about (p. 32). But there is more to it. To care about
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nothing is to be invested in it. It is to identify ourselves with our objects to projects about which we care and this makes us "vulnerable to losses and insensible to benefits" (Frankfurt, 83) depending on how they make out in a world. To care about something is in part to find or to choose an affinity for that thing. A typical example of such caring is that of parents to their children. The child's interests are the parent's interests, because the parent is invested in the welfare of the child. And as the child's well-being is enhanced so too is the well-being of the parent. Thus, parenting is often held up as a paragon of caring. However, this still is not all. There is a final factor in the Frankfurtian notion of care.

To care about something is more than just happening to believe that nothing is valuable or to want or to desire something to be the case. Coveting, wanting and desiring can happen for just a moment, but to care about something requires an extended pattern of thinking, feeling, and imagining it. It is a pattern of investment in an object of concern. A life of momentary likes and dislikes does not constitute an agent that cares about anything at all, because then caring would be indistinguishable from mere impulses, as Frankfurt (1988, p. 83-84) To care about something requires a persistence of attitude and behavior over time, as well as a pattern of appropriate dispositional responses to how well one's object of care fares over that time. By way of continued example, parents that only cared for their child for a moment or even moment to moment but did not see their parenting as an extended investment of themselves, a continued meaningful project, would not be the parents that care for their child; instead, such a parent would have a repeated act or desire rather than something they conceive as integral to who they are. The lesson is that it is easier to abandon our wants and desires than we can ourselves, says Frankfurt (84), precisely because of the projected investment that constitutes caring and which we do not find in mere wants and desires.

In sum, according to Frankfurt, to care about something is to be invested in the welfare of an object over time and to have such a care guide one's actions and behaviors accordingly. For our purposes here, I propose that the son who has any possibility of subjective well-being must nurture habits and act and feel in ways which reflect what they most care about. It is to have such objects of concern, whether they be people, principles, or the affairs, takes time to experience life and to reflect on various objects possible concern which life has to offer. In short, we must listen to ourselves so as to decide what to care about.

Returning now to social media. I am willing to grant, for now, that some of these games, such as MMORPGs, might enable users to be true to what they feel. The medium of these games is such that over a period of time, an avatar and find his own subjective welfare rising or falling with her fortunes. However, MMORPGs are neither the only form of social media nor the most popular form.

STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL MEDIA MAY PREVENT AUTHENTIC LIVING

Second Life and World of Warcraft boast a total of 34 million subscribers. By contrast, Facebook estimates 500 million active users, MySpace 100 million, and Twitter 175 million. As such, these other social media venues have between triple and 14 times the number of users in comparison to two of the most popular MMORPGs. However, the social interface of these venues is quite different than MMORPGs and, as I will suggest, the interface structures of these social media may jeopardize caring in ways that may not be threatened by MMORPGs (although I suspect that MMORPGs fail to contain fully worthy objects of care on other grounds).

In Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter you create a profile after which you are urged to make connections with others from your present, past, or with those who have mutual interests or associations. In Facebook, those with whom you become connected are called "friends." From there, you and other users are urged through both prompts and the Facebook culture to keep your friends updated as to what you are doing and thinking as well as to comment on what they are doing and thinking. For instance, at the top of your Facebook page, there is always the open dialogue box "What's on your mind?" Analogously, the entire mechanism for Twitter is to post to your network short messages, "tweets," about what you are thinking, doing, etc., and anyone subscribed to your account will receive your messages instantly. My concern hovers around to what extent interfaces, such as these, impede the kind of habits necessary for developing or sustaining cares to which we can be true, and on which our subjective well-being depends.

It must be acknowledged that the time expended in the most popular of these social media forums, Facebook, is significantly less than for the MMORPGs we considered above. The average user in January 2011 spent about 23 hours per month on Facebook. A year ago it was approximately 7 hours. So, the number of leisure hours dedicated to social networking is quickly gaining on the 88 hours per month for regular users of MMORPGs like World of Warcraft. So, the very popularity of Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter as leisure activities demands our attention. And although the number of hours spent on social networking still pales to the 88 hours averaged in World of Warcraft, it may also be the very speediness of Facebook and
Twitter and others that, I will suggest, makes these venues more adverse to the development and continuation of authentic caring—even while demanding fewer hours be logged actively Facebooking or tweeting.

TEXT BITES CREATE PEOPLE OF IMPULSE

In MMORPGs you are largely free to wander and experiment with interactions with others in a range of virtual venues of your own choosing. Twitter, Facebook, and to a lesser extent MySpace, corral users to certain kinds of interfaces. Facebook's “what’s on your mind” dialogue box, and the “like” button (among other tools) urge us to respond to others' lives as well as our own with little more than text bites (hypertext versions of “sound bites”) or finger clicks. In addition, it gobs users to various games and surveys which are meant to keep the user and her friends clicking and returning often to check their “news feed.” As a matter of armchair evidence, the depth of the interface—on the whole—appears pretty shallow. I certainly notice that users (even friends of mine with advanced degrees) seem moved to post the most hackneyed information about their lives. “Out to eat. Spaghetti or lasagne?” “Nite, nite, sleep tight...” “Today is the first day of the rest of your life...?” “I have a Master’s degree. Why can’t I figure out the nuts to change my car battery?”

These are each updates on Facebook I received in a 72 hour period. But why so many banal postings? One could post quite potent and meaningful updates, but such would take time for both writer and reader. Not only do such postings take time, but such extended time does not seem to be the culture of social networking sites. Unless your message can be captured in few words it will either be supported by the medium (as in Twitter where you have a 140 character limit) or your audience may simply post “tl;dr” (too long and did not read). And the reason that one may not take the time to engage in any depth of expression is that when your ideas, thoughts, feelings, etc., are posted they remain easily accessible on an update page for one or maybe two viewings if you have an active group of posting friends. Thus, the time spent to write a significant and meaningful post is often outweighed by the minimal impact it will have due to the structure of the medium. The point of the medium is to urge us to return often lest we miss some bit of important news, like what your friend finally chose to eat or that today really is the first day of the rest of your life, or—better yet—a novel meaningless post from a friend, but it does not readily support significantly nuanced interactions between friends.

Any medium that compresses the richness of human experience and reflection into quick, momentary, text bites or to the press of a hypertext link is a medium which because of its limited temporal existence urges us not to develop or sustain lasting concerns but rather to exist in the temporary and fluid realm of our immediate beliefs, attractions and repulsions. Such a medium seems to subvert our ability to be true to ourselves by encouraging us to be creatures of impulse rather than people who care. Cares require time to develop through experience, reflection, and seeing what it is like to live with the responsibility for caring about the welfare of an object or project (e.g. such as a friendship in the real world). Facebook, Twitter and other social media venues involve mechanisms which may be anathema to developing such essential cares.

Caring takes time, but “tweeting,” “friending,” and “liking” in the metaverse of social media are instantaneous. Instantaneousness may be the new opiate of the masses. And social media is but one more expression of the dope (Brabazon, 2007). If Fankfurt is correct, we cannot find life worth living if we do not care about something. However, to determine, to develop or even to sustain objects and projects toward which we may invest ourselves, about which our own existence comes to be interconnected and on which the value of our lives hangs together into a coherent pattern of thinking, feeling and acting, requires extended periods of time. It requires time for self-discovery or autonomous choice. We need to experience life, reflect on the quality of our experiences, compare experiences, and judge what it is that we want to protect and pursue in our lives.

However, the extended periods of time necessary to listen to ourselves are not on offer in the most popular forms of social media. For instance, if I wait to reflect on a friend’s post or tweet before I comment, it will quickly be old news and disappear from their update page or be lost in a whirl of novel, abbreviated postings. If I want to tweet a profound experience, I best be able to explicate it in 140 characters or less or it cannot be shared. In short, the most popular and growing social media venues lend themselves only to the entertainment of momentary impulses rather than in the development of cares through listening to oneself. But, as was said earlier, impulses cannot serve as a ground of subjective well-being, because impulses are fleeting and being true to oneself requires the extended commitments associated with caring about objects and projects in our lives. And, yet, ours is a culture that is ever increasingly coming to value and invest itself more and more in each individual having a presence in the metaverse of social networking. This does not bode well for human flourishing.

In fact, Hubert Dreyfus, in a different work, argues that the internet—in general—is structured altogether in such a way as to short-circuit our ability to develop genuine and lasting commitments (Dreyfus, 2001). Using Kierkegaard, Dreyfus argues that the internet’s deep neutrality, e.g. the fact that nearly anything can be uploaded and treated with equal value, causes a great “leveling” of importance. All links on the internet are equal, according to Dreyfus, and this form of egalitarianism makes it difficult, if not improbable,
for users to develop genuine commitments to things in a world that does not present itself as having objects more or less worthy of our attentions. Thus, it follows for Dreyfus that in the world of the internet Push-Pin truly is as good as poetry. As such, I am not the first to worry about the internet’s inability to aid humans in their need to have objects and projects of care. However, my concern is about its speed subverting our ability to care rather than its value neutrality (although I am moved to believe that dimension of the internet is problematic as well).

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?

Critics may protest the account on offer here either makes much ado about nothing or states the obvious. It may be claimed that I make too much of nothing, because the lack of depth of conversation on social networking sites is really no different than the mundane nature of ordinary face-to-face conversation. Our real-time conversations with others reflect mostly meaningless content as well. It may also be said that I am stating the obvious, because of course it is the case that social networking cannot be the basis of discovering proper objects and projects of care, but it can be used to help sustain the things we care about and discover in the material world as we find it. Let me take each of these criticisms in turn.

It is true that much ordinary conversation is relatively cursory and lacks much meaning and value to its interlocutors in and of itself. However, ordinary conversation is not structurally stilted (nor is ordinary writing for that matter) to favor only the cursory and fleeting in the way that social media are so structured. We can easily shift course in ordinary conversation to express and explore more deeply held objects of concern when time permits. Our speaking and writing is not artificially restricted by word count, etc., such that we can explore a range of ideas from the mundane to the most profound. In contrast, social networking interfaces have word and time limits that structurally and artificially truncate our conversations. Thus, social media’s mechanics and culture promote shallow over deep understanding between those linked in its space. As such, it—by design—limits our ability to explore what we should really care about in favor of immediately present desires.

Even if we admit that genuine objects of care cannot be discovered in the metaverse of social networking, opponents will say that it can still be the case that it aids us in sustaining objects of care which are discovered or chosen in the experience of real life. Many report that they like the fact that social media enable them to maintain relationships in ways that they could not easily do otherwise, e.g. due to time or distance (Ellison et al., 2007). However, there are concerns about social media increasing teen risk-taking behavior due to the fact that social media allow for a certain measure of ano-

nymity from other users which in turn mitigates the level at which they can be held responsible for their behavior, and it appears that it may extend adolescent narcissism. As such, the medium may pose a risk to developing mature caring about civility and friendship (LaPorta, 2009). And, there is a concern, called the “internet paradox,” in which newly connected users find that they distance themselves from their family and friends, and subsequently are more depressed, in spite of the fact that the connectivity of social media is meant to bring people closer together (Kraut et al., 1998). Now, the results of research on the internet paradox are mixed. Some indicate the results mentioned above, and others show that users overcome this initial downturn in their own well-being and return to a state where they reconnect with objects of care like family and friends after the novelty of social media wears off (Kraut et al., 2002). However, one constant of the research is that significant numbers of users in long term studies report increased levels of stress. I surmise that stress arises because of juggling too many expectations between real and virtual relationships. As such, it appears that engagement with social media may not aid entirely in sustaining objects of care, such as interpersonal relationships in a life without unnecessary stress.

Connected to this criticism, the critic may ask, “Well what about the success of social media in something like the Arab Spring?” Did not the populace make good use of social media to express their deepest concerns about Arab leaders? In something like the Arab Spring, people did mine the resource of social media to express and nurture their object of care. However, note that they did not discover this object in virtual space, but in the material conditions of the real world. And, these people lived in a context in which due to a lack of options in the real world, they both discovered their object of care (e.g. greater freedom) as well as were moved to social media as a venue through which to care about their object (due to the lack of freedom to express their discontents openly). In the context of the western liberal world, it seems that people who have the privilege to access the internet generally have options galore. In fact, they may have too many options (Haybron, 2008). Thus, following Dreyfus, the world of social media in such a context just adds more value neutral options to the mix of all the possible objects and projects that one could value or pursue, but none stand out as more important than anything else. And, we are driven, via the speed of social media, to merely express our most present desires and whims rather than to reflect upon that which we care about most.

The nexus of the difficulties posed by social networking, I contend, is the pace or speed of the interactions. It is the instantaneous nature of social media which threatens to thwart our capacities to reflect and to choose by rewarding the impulsive and the merely casual. And it is through reflecting on our lived experience and choosing some projects or objects of importance, i.e. listening to oneself, that we can really be true to ourselves. And, being
true to ourselves is a condition for the possibility of finding our own lives worth living. However, at this juncture, a bit more should be said about the nature and value of discovering that which one most cares about.

THE ADJUNCTIVE VALUE

The process of discovery of our cares is best interpreted as an “adjunctive” value or virtue rather than a substantive or core value. An adjunctive virtue, according to Robert Audi and Patrick Murphy (2006), is a virtue that is not sought for its own sake and can be implemented for good or ill, and as such it is not a core virtue or good. Instead, an adjunctive virtue is a catalyst for achieving core goods or enhances core goods in various ways. It is not a good-in-itself because conscientiousness may enable good or evil ends, for example, systematic discrimination. Nevertheless, conscientiousness most certainly acts as an indispensable support to anyone’s goods. What might such an account of listening to oneself look like in individual lives?

We may begin to understand the supportive or adjunctive value of discovering or choosing one’s cares by contrasting it with ways in which the impulsiveness of social media can be disruptive to the project of acquiring and sustaining objects of ultimate concern. If we place the expectation on persons that they complete a task in a short period of time, e.g. rush them, then they will not be able to sustain objects of their concern in ways that would when they have time to reflect. For instance, as psychologists John Darley and Daniel Batson (1973) discovered, even the presumably morally best of us will act contrary to easily fulfilled moral duties when pressed for time. In a series of experiments on the likelihood that people will act as good Samaritans, Darley and Batson tested seminarians. Some subjects were made to rush, and some were not, in order to give either a sermon on the parable of the Good Samaritan or on job opportunities in the clergy. Of those rushed to deliver their talk, 90% of these seminarians failed to stop and aid a person that was obviously in need of help, regardless of whether or not they were sent to speak on the Good Samaritan or job opportunities.

Darley and Batson’s work indicates that even the ability to meet the demands of common decency will suffer under time constraints, and common decency is but one common object of care (especially, one would think, among seminarians). Hence, there is some body of evidence for the claim that to impose a need for the instantaneous or the speedy and the merely casual may cause us to sacrifice objects or projects of personal importance, such as, helping others in need or personal principles. On the other hand, if people were to come to know the ways in which the pace of social media may contribute to sacrificing objects of their concern then might it be that more people would find the social media life less satisfying?

Another dimension that arises, even from one reading of the Darley and Batson experiment, (and one might read this into Milgram’s infamous authority experiments as well) is that many people find the expectations of others translating into strong internal motivations to act and which are difficult to escape. As such, it appears that many people’s sense of being rushed is likely a well-conditioned internalization of the motivational force of meeting others’ expectations (especially those in positions of power or those who the agent values). In such a scenario, it is the case that people’s freedom is curtailed and social media are structured, as I said above, to urge us to quickly respond to others’ posts and to post regularly about ourselves.

If people’s sense of self-determination is sacrificed to the expectations of a medium which urges in us an impulsive need to visit it often and to respond quickly and pithily to the posts of others, then part of the value of self-discovery of what one cares about is that it enables people’s sense of self-determination. So, any account of such self-reflection, should acknowledge the importance of people’s freedom to take their time in considering what they want to care about. So, the process of such self-discovery may be thought of as an adjunctive value to the value of personal freedom, in addition to contributing directly to living a life we find personally worthwhile.

OBJECTS AND PROJECTS OF GENUINE CONCERN

I have urged that social media, at least in the guise of social networking sites, truncates our ability to find and sustain objects and projects of genuine concern. And, I have also urged that it is the speed which these media impose on us that is the cause the truncation. The imperative to be instantaneous and concise which, I suggest, is the heart of social networking interfaces, interferes with our ability to listen to ourselves and to discover what we care about. And without objects and projects to which we are personally committed we cannot be true to ourselves and to find a life which is fulfilling by our own lights. In conclusion, I want to suggest that these reflections urge us to use our leisure time, at least some of such time, in certain kinds of ways. One way is negative and the other positive.

First, and foremost, we should concern ourselves with the fact that users of social media are now averaging 2.5 hours per month on social networking. This is the equivalent of a part-time job, but presumably it is a use of our leisure time (even if it’s on a break from work). And the reflections above advise that we ought to refrain from filling our leisure time solely with the sort of instantaneous activities which appear to be conducive to our projects and concerns but really aren’t. In the same manner as many warn against filling one’s leisure time with distractions of the television, the ruminations above warn us to not be fooled into thinking that social media aids us in
discovering how to be true to ourselves. This normative warning should come as no surprise, because anything which consumes all our leisure time is likely to be vicious rather than virtuous. However, we should also take care not to be hoodwinked into thinking that our time spent in social media is anything much deeper than the instantaneous gratification found in many other passive forms of entertainment like television. For the speed of social media, like the passiveness of watching television, truncates our ability to come to care about the welfare of objects and projects in our lives.

Second, and much more positively, we should guard some of our spare time for more productive forms of leisure. An example of such may be what Annette Holba (2010) calls, “philosophical leisure.” Holba builds an account of philosophical leisure, from both the history of the value of leisure and the phenomenology of our experience of it, in order to recall a “productive quiet” from the noise of “recreation” or entertainment. And, this “productive quiet” is either synonymous with or is the ground for self-discovery of which I wrote above. A part of our leisure time should be devoted to ruminating about that to which we are ultimately devoted or committed, and how the things for which we care ought to guide our behavior, as well as how these objects and projects contribute to who we are. As was urged above, in order to lead a fulfilling life by our own lights, we must have projects and objects about which we ultimately care. But, such things do not come to self-conscious commitment without attentive reflection. And some use of leisure should be aimed at that project, which I take to be part of Holba’s defense of philosophical leisure. In short, without this use of some of our leisure time, we may lack the ability to be genuinely true to ourselves, which is one nexus in leading a fulfilling life.

NOTE


REFERENCES