Throughout the modern industrial era there has been a quiet but consistent call for us to slow down the tempos of our lives. At the very least, since the American Transcendentalists (although I make no confident historical claim here), various individuals as well as small fellowships of people have warned against the perils of living too fast, of taking the machine as the model for our lives and, instead, to celebrate slow living. Now, possibly more than ever, we see a larger popular movement or, at least, a coincidental rise of a greater number of individuals and organizations calling for slowness. Organizations and grassroots movements such as the Society for the Deceleration of Time, Slow Food International, as well as the Sloth Club of Japan, as well as increased interest in such decompression activities as Tai Chi, Yoga, and Slow Vacation Resorts, bear witness to the rise in a desire to slow down.

This growing sense of unease with contemporary living and the call to ease the pressures to live life faster is neither better surveyed nor championed than by Carl Honoré in his In Praise of Slowness: Challenging the Cult of Speed (2004), as well as his blog “Slow Planet,” http://www.slowplanet.com/. Honoré masterfully consolidates the various strands of slow living from the more esoteric ruminations that one might find at meetings of the Society for the Deceleration of Time and Keibo Oiwa’s Sloth Club to the most practical calls one finds in the intensifying interests in Tantric Sex, Tai Chi, Slow Vacations and Slow Food. Each and every one of these manifestations of the slow movement has its own nascent intellectual life, and Honoré nicely
captures the intellectual core of this nebulous movement. And in this he declares that in spite of the fact that the movement is still taking shape, “a genuinely slow world implies nothing short of a lifestyle revolution.” And at the core of this movement, which Honoré asserts is a philosophy of life, is the axiological claim that slow is good.

The aim of this paper is to explore the myriad of meanings found in advocates’ proclamation that “slow is good” in order to critically consider what is valuable about slowness and how such might best be expressed. The perspectives on the value of slow arise from reflecting on proponents’ avowals and elucidations of their most cherished value—slowness. Here we will explore three general interpretations of the moral value of slowness which appear to take shape upon reflection. These ethical perspectives include: the “consequentialist,” the “libertarian,” and “virtue” perspectives. What shall be shown is that each of these viewpoints illuminates something both interesting and useful about the nature and value of slowness, but each perspective fails in a significant respect to adequately capture what anyone might reasonably assert about slowness as a value. In the end, it will be argued that it is best to interpret slowness as an adjunctive value or virtue that enables other values to be realized in their best possible way. And, the implications of this interpretation for slow living as a movement will be briefly explored.

I think it is fair to say that in the contemporary scene people find being beckoned to “slow down” a tantalizing proposition. The mere level of interest shown in Honoré’s book and the growth of the organizations and activities noted above speak to people’s attention toward the speed and time economy of their lives. As a person in the early 21st century, with a spouse, three kids, three dogs, and a mortgage, I surely find the idea that I can live a fulfilling life at a slower pace extremely enticing. As a philosopher, however, I want to know what it is that makes a slow life fulfilling and what a slow life prescribes for me to do and to be. My only hesitation in conducting this, albeit brief, investigation is the worry that once one brings a philosophic eye to such a proposal that where there was once a tantalizing proposition one will ultimately find either empty rhetoric or simple platitudes. With such hesitation noted, let us turn to the first interpretative perspective on the value of slowness.

The Consequentialist Perspective on Slowness

Kamei Shuji is the focus of an oft repeated cautionary tale of a life without respite. (Google search provided 91 hits with Kamei Shuji.) Shuji was an ultra successful Japanese stockbroker during the 1980s. He earned the lauded
inclusion in the *kigyo senshi* (corporate warriors), and he was held out as the gold standard for all members of his firm and brokerage houses in general. Shuji often worked 90 hour work weeks (13 hours per day 7 days a week), and when the Nikkei bubble began to burst he worked all the more. Shuji died in 1989 of a myocardial infarction. He was 26 years old. Occurrences like Shuji have been prevalent enough in modern Japan that they have an officially recognized cause of death called *karoshi* (i.e., death from overwork). And, Tatsuo Inoue suggests that the fact that a modern industrial nation has found itself needing to recognize such as an official cause of death is more of the cautionary tale than even Shuji’s individual story.3

Many slow proponents emphasize the idea that *speed kills!* They emphasize the ways in which the expectation of modern life to “get things done” increases people’s levels of stress, decreases the amount of sleep they get, and—as the mission of the Slow Food Movement laments—“forces them to eat fast food.”4 In light of this, the slow food advocates also call attention to the ways in which the “have it now” pace of modern life undermines local businesses and regional agriculture in favor of multinational corporations and agribusiness. So speed has adverse effects not only on individuals but on communities and the globe generally.

In contrast to the warnings about the cult of speed, Honoré shares his findings on the city of Bra, Italy. This is the home of Carlo Petrini’s Slow Food movement, and the city itself has embraced the principles of slow living within its very mission and city planning. In his report, a young financial consultant and citizen of Bra, Sergio Contegiacomo states,

> The main thing (living in Bra) is that you do not become obsessed with time. Instead, you enjoy each moment as it comes. In a Slow City you have the licence to relax, to think, to reflect on the big existential questions. Rather than get caught up in the storm and speed of the modern world, where all you do is get in the car, go to work, then hurry home, you take time to walk and meet people in the street. It’s a little bit like living in a fairy tale.5

And so goes a defense of slow-living, by contrasting the effects of speed and slowness on human health and satisfaction.

A significant part of the apologetics surrounding slow living hover about the conditions that pressure us to have material success and social recognition, and how such pressures move us to live in ways that have adverse health effects on each of us as individuals as well as pose a variety of public health, economic, and environmental concerns. And such admonitions are contrasted with the benefits of living at a slower pace. As one may note, that
within much of the popular literature on slow-living, the claims of a causal connection between the momentum of life and hazardous as well as beneficial effects on us are largely anecdotal and far from completely established. However, it betrays a way of thinking about the connection between the value of a life lived and its pace. It divulges an intellectual assumption that the value of slowness is directly related to the value of its consequences. This is the heart of the consequentialist rendering of slowness as a value.

What counts as living at excessive pace is, and will likely remain, controversial as well as theory-laden. Nevertheless, anecdotes like that of Kamei Shuji as well as Sergio Contegiacomo (as well as many others one finds in the literature and blogs concerned with the pace of modern life) could be prima facie evidence for the claim that the tempo at which we are expected to perform activities in our daily lives either contributes to or undermines human well-being. However, it is clear that stress, i.e. when an individual perceives that life’s demands either tax or exceed her adaptive capacity, is reasonably linked to ill health and lack of well-being, but it is less clear whether or not the pace of life is necessarily connected with stress.

Physicians Stewart Cohen, Denise Janicki-Deverts, and Gregory Miller sum up the connection between stress and health in JAMA:

Generally, stressful events are thought to influence the pathogenesis of physical disease by causing negative affective states (e.g., feelings of anxiety and depression), which in turn exert direct effects on biological processes or behavioral patterns that influence disease risk. Exposures to chronic stress are considered the most toxic because they are the most likely to result in long-term or permanent changes in the emotional, physiological, and behavioral responses that influence susceptibility to and course of disease.6

This statement reflects the widely accepted belief in medical circles that there exists a connection between stress and both physical as well as psychological illness. However, slow proponents’ concerns over karoshi as well as other individual health issues assume a connection between living with time-compression and stress.

First, given the consequential leanings of the above kinds of considerations, it must be acknowledged that it is notoriously difficult to isolate and measure the ill or beneficial effects of the pace of life, and this would include the connection between the pace of living and stress. But, this has not deterred the attempt to try to discover whether or not there exists a causal connection between the tempo of life and levels of stress. The available measurements of time-budgets, as reported by the sociologist Manfred Garhammer in his encyclopaedic article “Pace of Life and Enjoyment of Life” (2002),
demonstrates that citizens of the developed world have less time for their own individual pursuits and that they subjectively recognize that they would prefer to have more personal time as well as to be less rushed in their activities. However, in Garhammer’s research, a paradox emerges. In the countries that have demonstrably the greatest time pressures, the UNDP Survey of Human Satisfaction also reports the highest levels of subjective well-being. This appears to speak against the central consequentialist assumption on the value of slow living, in that if speed equals stress and stress causes a decrease in the quality of life, then it should follow that those nations with faster lives should report lower satisfaction with life. This is not to deny that some people in the most developed nations do not suffer from time-related stress, but that these appear to be countered in the aggregate.\footnote{7}

Garhammer, however, proposes an account for the paradox of increasing well-being running in tandem with an increase and recognition of a lack of personal time. Inspired by the work of George Simmel, Garhammer argues that the contemporary world offers quantitatively more temporary and intense or novel pleasurable activities which we are able to fit into shorter periods of time or may be done simultaneously with other activities (e.g., multitasking). And this sheer abundance of easy pleasures counters our sense of losing time for ourselves. But, it also follows that the contemporary pace of life forces us to sacrifice more temporally extended activities that we might find to be richer and more personally meaningful for the sake of quick and less involved activities. So, we settle for the enjoyment of a 30 minute situation comedy (only 20 minutes if you own a digital video recorder) rather than commit to the time required to take up a more time intensive hobby. And, it is suggested that these quick pleasures may mask or merely make the distress we experience more tolerable, but they fall short of being fully worthwhile.

Although the above hypothesis does seem plausible, the upshot of a consequentialist interpretation of the value of living slow is that at present the data fails to substantiate the strong causal link between pace and the quality of living. The data—both qualitative and anecdotal—is duplicitous over the value of the speed of living. Although it appears a little more decisive in the case of stress, it remains unclear whether or not pace is causally relevant to stress (in spite of the fact that stress has a correlative relationship to lack of well-being both objectively and subjectively). As such, the greatest obstacle to rendering the value of slowness from a consequentialist standpoint is that proponents of slow living must provide a more substantiated account of what goods are to be produced and evils avoided in designing a life and way of communal living around the value of slowness.
As a result of a general lack of specificity about the value of slow (it may actually be too much specificity and not enough generality), I will venture an informed, reasonable list of goods that slowness is meant to promote. Slow living aims to result in good physical and psychological health, more pleasure, sustainable practices, and the support of local economies. Prima facie, it appears that various practices recommended by proponents of slow living could achieve these goods, but it is far from clear that slowness must fare better at achieving these goods than a life that is fast, but lacks stress, has proper exercise, activities that people find authentically pleasurable, and which is guided by sound environmental principles. Given such, it seems that if “slow is good” then one should be reticent to conceive of its goodness solely on the basis of what other goods it might bring about (or at least one should not be so confident in its effects prior to further study and delineation). But we do not have reason to jettison the slow movement quite yet. Defenders of slowness do not limit their claims to only such a teleological perspective.

The Libertarian Perspective on the Value of Slow

Advocates of slowness are quick to defend themselves from the charge that they are espousing some cynical view of progress and a return to a life without planes, trains, automobiles, faxes and e-mail. They say that they are not Luddites. They value the speed of their computers and other quick modern technologies. Carl Honoré responds to the question of whether or not the Slow Movement is against speed. He states:

No, absolutely not. I love speed. I like my Internet connection to be fast and I play two of the fastest sports around, ice-hockey and squash, in my spare time. I live in London, which is a city of volcanic energy, and I enjoy working to deadlines. Speed has its place in the modern world. Often you have to move quickly, particularly at work. The problem is that speed has become a way of life. We do everything in a rush. We are stuck in fast forward and that is unhealthy.8

We have already discussed the fact that more needs to be established to causally connect life’s tempo with ill or good health. However, if slowness is not categorically valuable, then in what sense is slow good?

In an interview with the founder of the Slow Food Movement, Carlo Petrini (and one will find the same sentiment in a number of his own writings on slow food) helps to clarify the claim that slow is not anti-speed:

If you are always slow, then you are stupid—and that is not at all what we are aiming for. Being slow means that you control the rhythms of your own life.
You decide how fast you have to go in any given context. If I want to go fast, I go fast; if tomorrow I want to go slow, I go slow. What we are fighting for is the right to determine our own tempos.9

In Petrini’s mind, the movement for slowness is a matter of a right of self-determination. In his mind and what drives—in part—his Slow Food Movement is the fact that modern society has limited our ability to choose how to live. And this sentiment is often offered as a counter to the challenge that the Slow Movement is a regressive rather than progressive movement.

There is likely to be something to the fact that part of the reason that many find the Slow Movement attractive is due to a sense of not being in control of their lives. As Garhammer’s data indicates, people sense that they have less and less time to pursue their own interests, because external forces—community, work, children, etc.—demand their attention and rush them to complete multiple tasks that edge out more personal projects.

This push for individual self-determination is the crux of the libertarian interpretation of the value of slowness. However, parallel to the consequentialist interpretation that sees the value of slowness in the value of external effects, the value of slowness under the libertarian interpretation is not slowness or the pace of life itself, but individual freedom. What is valuable in this light is that the conditions of the world not remove people’s option of choosing whether or not we will engage in fast or slow activities. As such, it is meant to be a liberation movement, where we should aim to build and to maintain institutions that preserve and promote our freedom to choose the speed of our lives. This is not to disparage the idea that it may be good to have more control over the pace of one’s life, but it should be acknowledged that it does not follow that slowness itself is what is valuable.

There remains a final ethical interpretation of slowness that should be considered. It is the interpretation of slowness as a virtue. Here it shall be seen that some virtue accounts fare better than others in their attempt to adequately capture slowness as a value.

### The Virtue Interpretation

A canonical way to interpret slowness as an ethical value would be to claim that it is a set of dispositions and actions that make for a life well-lived. And to adequately come to understand the proper dispositions and actions we should acquire an understanding of the type of person who excels in living slowly. In fact, predating discussions of slowness there have been discussions of the nature and function of leisure as a kind of practical virtue.
In the discussion of leisure, Sebastian de Grazia, affectionately known as the “father of leisure studies,” defended a strict Aristotelian account of leisure. In his account, leisure time—time free from work—should be spent in contemplation and listening to music, which reflect the best in human capabilities. Although contemplation and listening to music are amongst the activities that proponents of slow living will find to be exemplary slow activities, they are much too libertarian to claim that the virtues of slowness would be limited to only this pair of enjoyable pursuits. But, claims that echo virtue ethics abound in the slowness movement. For instance, the motto on the Slow Planet web site states, “Slow is not about doing everything at a snail’s pace; it’s about working, playing and living better by doing everything at the right speed.”

In fact, much of the slow movement has its eyes set on transforming life into a greater balance between work and leisure or hitting a mean between frenzy and boredom. But there are two ways in which such balance is expressed. At both the individual and collective levels there are the aims to counter balance the present excess of work and frenzy. Throughout Carl Honoré and Kiebo Oiwa’s anecdotes of people promoting slow living we encounter stories of those engaging in practices that strongly oppose the contemporary speed of life. However, such practices tend toward the other extreme such as supporting genuine “sloth,” slow vacations which aim to completely isolate the traveler from the outside world, or working only on part-time, temporary bases. These examples are in contrast to the stated aims of the Slow Movement to inspire and deliver ways of living that are more in line with an ideal of moderation or balance. The goal of promoting moderation or balance is to head off the challenge that the movement is regressive rather than progressive. It is to demonstrate that the movement aspires to promote and make practicable something approaching “productive slowness.” It is to be disposed to live a life of activity that is at once economically and creatively productive as well as personally meaningful while avoiding lapsing into either excessive productivity or boredom—each of which is meaningless.

The challenges for these canonical virtue interpretations of slowness are (as Mike Martin correctly elucidates in his paper in this volume) being able to substantively account for the balance that slowness seeks as well as avoiding the equally extreme view of lackadaisicalness as a counter to the frenzy of modern life. And, in this vein, such a view will need to look to the full breadth of human dispositions to feel and to act, such as to account for moderation in the virtuously slow agent’s dispositions to feel certain ways as well as at what speed she is disposed to take and maintain activities. It is here that I suspect that a virtue interpretation might find its greatest challenge.
Any ethical theorist desires to capture how we ought to live. And it is incumbent upon the proponent of slow living and who wishes to interpret it as a connected set of dispositions to think, feel, and act in certain ways, to say something substantive about what counts from their point of view. From the affective side, this is probably not such a challenge. The virtuously slow agent will feel the proper level of motivation to act, e.g., feeling neither too anxious nor too listless. Slow agents must have an emotional life that keeps them actively involved in their pursuits, but where they are not disposed to immoderate anxiety or undifferentiated nervousness. The affective side to the thinking about slowness is actually quite simple, because so much of the discussion in these circles (as well as all self-help discussions) is about how human beings should feel about their lives while living them. And, such discussions inevitably circle around to the goals of relieving stress and feeling contentment. The real challenge for the virtue interpretation of slowness is to say something substantive about what speed a virtuously slow agent would live.

In order to be useful, anyone defending a virtue interpretation of slowness should say something more substantive than the virtuously slow agent “does everything at the right speed.” Although, at the most general level, doing everything at the proper speed might be all that defenders can say about the proper tempo of activity for the slow agent. Such would be due to the reasonable supposition that every activity has a proper pace. This, however, forces the substance of their view to come to the details of sorting what is doing something too fast and too slow for such diverse activities as work, play, etc. But, here again, each type of work, type of play, and possibly even each token of any type, could have its own “proper” pace. Thus, espousing this interpretation, like many an Aristotelian virtue ethic before this, might suffer from a lack of tractable explication; thus, the detailed understanding which would be desired for explicit guidance to a better way of living may be too much to hope for from this interpretation of the value of slow.

**Slowness—A Unified Account?**

As we have seen, each interpretation of slowness has its own intuitive plausibility. It appears entirely plausible that living life at a slower, less anxious pace would have both psychological and physiological benefits (and possible other benefits more remotely related to the pace of life). It is also intuitively plausible that there are qualities associated with living life in distinct tempos, and that some tempos yield states of consciousness and action that are more pleasurable than others. There is also *prima facie* plausibility that what is best about the Slow Movement is an attempt to recapture self-determination
with regards to each person being able to control the tempo of each of their activities. Finally, it seems credible that to live slowly is to embody some set of dispositions to think, feel, and act that are part of a life worth living. However, in spite of the fact that each of the above interpretations of the value of slowness has intuitive appeal, each interpretation has its general drawbacks that make any one of the interpretations insufficient for capturing slowness as a global value.

So, in what remains, I would like to try to capture the plausibility of slowness as a practical value, but I would also like to mitigate worries that arise for each of the above positions. However, to accomplish this, I would like to suggest that proponents steer clear of more Panglossian prognostications on the value of slowness and to accept a humbler but more manageable accounting of their cherished value. Here I will suggest, utilizing a distinction introduced by Robert Audi and Patrick Murphy, that slowness is best interpreted as an “adjunctive” value or virtue rather than as a substantive or core value or virtue. An adjunctive virtue, according to Audi and Murphy, is a virtue that is not sought for its own sake and can be implemented for good or ill, and as such it is not a core virtue or good. Instead, an adjunctive virtue is a catalyst for achieving core goods or enhances such core goods in various ways. An example of such an adjunctive virtue, as noted by Audi and Murphy, is conscientiousness. It is not a good-in-itself, because conscientiousness may enable immoral ends, for example, systematic discrimination. Nevertheless, conscientiousness most certainly acts as an indispensable support to such core goods as respect, honesty, integrity, and others as well. Applying this idea to slowness, however, would require slow proponents to dislodge thinking of slowness as a central value around which they can build an entirely new philosophy of life, and to accept it simply as an important value which promotes the attainment of other values and/or enhances the experience of more core values. But, what might such an account of slowness look like?

We may begin to understand the supportive or adjunctive value of slowness, by contrasting it with ways in which the acceleration or speed of modern life can be disruptive of core values. (And, concerns of this type are well utilized by proponents of slowness.) Although Garhammer’s research indicates that the increased tempo of one’s life does not generally correspond to a decreasing level of satisfaction, one can see how time restrictions can certainly have adverse consequences to a life well-lived. The practice of medicine, for instance, recognizes the ways in which time-constraints can exacerbate misdiagnoses and other medical mistakes. And, as psychologists John Darley and Daniel Batson discovered, even the presumably morally best of us will act contrary to easily fulfilled moral duties when pressed for time. In a series of
experiments on the likelihood that people will act as good samaritans, Darley and Batson tested seminarians. Some were made to rush, and some were not, in order to give either a sermon on the parable of the Good Samaritan or on job opportunities in the clergy. Of those being rushed to deliver their talk, 90% of these seminarians failed to stop and aid a person that was obviously in need of help, regardless of whether or not they were sent to speak on good samaritanism or job opportunities. So, in addition to the fact that time pressure can contribute to poorer quality of work as it can in medicine, Darley and Batson's work indicates that the ability to meet the demands of common decency will suffer under time constraints as well. Hence, although we may not find definitive connections between a fast paced life and personal satisfaction or happiness, there does appear to be some body of evidence that speed causes us to sacrifice other objects of value such as helping and avoiding harm to others. On the other hand, if people were to come to know the ways in which the pace of modern life contributes to sacrificing other core values, then might it be that more people would find the pace of such a life less satisfying? (In fact, modern westerners may simply suffer from a kind of self-deception when it comes to personal satisfaction—maybe some form of circular reasoning where we are supposed to be satisfied; therefore, we are satisfied.)

Evidence that other things of value are easily sacrificed in the face of pressures to be hasty lend some prima facie support to the consequentialist rendering of the value of slowness. A reading of slowness as an adjunctive virtue or value, clearly accepts that it is a good when it enables other goods of intrinsic worth. Thus, this rendering jibes well with the consequentialist intuitions early, but retreats from the all-encompassing claim of slowness as a general value of living. As a result, the most that proponents ought to conclude is that slowness regularly contributes to the production and enjoyment of other values that we find desirable (even if it may not with some other values). The values may include health, welfare of self and others, as well as economic and other material goods such as a clean environment.

Another dimension that arises, even from one reading of the Darley and Batson experiment (and one might read this into Millgram's infamous experiments as well), is that many people find the expectations of others translating into strong internal motivations to act and which are difficult to escape. As such, it appears that many people's sense of being rushed is likely a well-conditioned internalization of the motivational force of meeting others' expectations (especially those in positions of power or those who see in the agent certain role expectations), coupled with both personal and institutional demands to be both optimally efficient as well as productive. In such a scenario, it is the case that people's freedom is curtailed, and the sense that
they have no live options for choosing the pace of their lives without also seriously committing to changes in much of their lifestyle, would motivate a libertarian interpretation of slowness.

If people’s sense of self-determination is sacrificed to the expectations of others, their roles, the institutions in which they live and work, and part of these expectations is to always be on-the-go, then part of the value of slowness is it enables people’s sense of self-determination; especially if being slow promotes such freedom at little expense to others or their organizations. So, any account of slowness should acknowledge the value of people’s right to determine the pace or speed of their lives. Respect for such freedom need not even have to compete with some consequentialist conditions noted earlier (although it certainly will in some circumstances). Recent economic conditions in Europe suggest that a population can be as economically productive as the most frenzied nations, such as the U.S. (adjusting for population), even though workers have a greater amount and flexibility for personal time than do U.S. citizens. This suggests that slowness in economic activities could enable people to have more personal time and greater self-determination without substantially sacrificing economic goods. So, slowness could be an adjunctive value to the value of personal freedom (without sacrificing other goods such as economic growth).

In summation, a generally unified account of slowness which shows how it may be valuable from the perspective of consequences, human freedom, and human character is entirely possible. And it is beneficial to our understanding of slowness as an important aspect of living well. However, I have suggested that the best means for rendering this value requires that proponents retreat from the more “revolutionary” and philosophically sweeping interpretations of slowness as a core or central value to a life well-lived. Instead, what best provides a unified and useful account of this value is to see it as an adjunctive or enabling virtue or value. On this account, when some things are approached or done slowly this best contributes to the achievement or experience of other core values such as those already favored by proponents within the Slow Movement. As has been demonstrated above, it can be seen how acceleration inhibits such a core value as helping others in need and, conversely, a world without a demand for undue swiftness would likely facilitate such a good (and others). Additionally, slowness could contribute to people having more self-determination and less being compelled into certain behaviors. Finally, it follows that slowness (if considered as a personality trait) is such that it would be both useful in producing other goods across a person’s life as well as being a disposition that both the agent and others find makes their way of living more agreeable.
Notes

2. Ibid., 14.
3. Ibid., 6ff.
6. Honoré, 87.
8. Manfred Garhammer, “Pace and the Enjoyment of Life,” *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 2002, 3(3), 217–256. Of note is that his own hypothesis is rooted in George Simmel’s account of the pace of life in which people are driven to experience more novelty or stimulus in a shorter period of time; thus, we associate satisfaction with greater increased quantities of novel experiences. There is also an excellent discussion of the divergence between life satisfaction and well-being in Daniel Haybron’s *The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well Being* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
10. Honoré, 16.
15. Honoré, 189ff.
16. I would like to thank Rico Vitz for particularly helpful and challenging comments on an earlier version of this paper delivered at the First Annual Symposium on Public Philosophy in Jacksonville, FL. I would also like to thank the rest of the symposium participants for their helpful questions as well.